Motion 133

In 2004, IUCN adopted Res 3.007, a moratorium on the further release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Since then, synthetic biology has led to new genetic engineering technologies, with applications that pose great risks to biodiversity and the web of life – especially as these technologies converge with generative AI [1].

Synthetic biology is now moving genetic engineering into complex natural ecosystems, some of which are poorly understood scientifically, i.e. microbial communities. It can now turn nature into a "field lab" with tools like self-spreading vaccines and gene drives, which spread genetic modifications in the wild with no way to reverse or recall them [2]. Significant risks would be taken in these scenarios [3; 4], as impacts on complex environments across space and time cannot be predicted solely by examining genetic interventions in a single organism [5; 6]. Ecological risks could include the spread of genetic modifications to non-target species, potentially altering or eradicating entire populations, ecosystems and food webs. Also, the disruption of keystone species and critical microbial communities could trigger cascading effects, threatening ecosystem health. Furthermore, many applications are likely to have transboundary effects. Our existing international frameworks, including mechanisms for liability and redress, are not adequately established to address these challenges.

The draft policy developed under Res. 7.123 suggests that any proposed synthetic biology application be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. While this approach is valuable when feasible, applications of genetic engineering in wild ecosystems necessitate a broader precautionary approach. This is because individual assessments are often constrained by limitations in risk assessment methodologies (e.g. knowledge gaps, cumulative effects and insufficient robustness of risk models amidst complexity and climate change) and by the challenges in implementing effective risk management measures (esp. the lack of retrievability).

The policy developed under Res 7.123, to ensure that it is future-proof, has been kept procedural and does not address specific scenarios. Thus, it can be meaningfully complemented by a moratorium on genetic engineering of wild species in natural ecosystems, operationalizing the precautionary principle.

The scenarios [7] addressed under Res. 7.123 also raise several critical ethical questions for the nature conservation community to explore. One key issue is whether genetic engineering aligns with the IUCN's principles of preserving nature's integrity and diversity. Also worldviews associated with some interventions may not only conflict with the perspectives of some Indigenous communities but also undermine biodiversity conservation practices. Further concerns include generational equity in releasing irreversible technologies, the ethical implications of deciding to eradicate populations, and who holds the authority to make such decisions.

This motion offers an opportunity to apply the precautionary approach and carefully consider the unresolved ethical and scientific questions.

[1] CBD/SYNBIO/AHTEG/2024/1/3
[2] Simon et al. 2018: doi 10.15252/embr.201845760
[3] Giese 2021: doi 10.15252/embr.202153229
[4] Lentzos et al. 2022: 10.1126/science.abj5593
[5] Shah et al. 2021: doi 10.1525/elementa.2020.00072
[6] Steinbrecher 2024: https://bit.ly/GE-Chestnut
[7] Redford et al 2019: doi: 10.1017/S0030605314000040